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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant wishes to respond to the arguments and issues 
brought up by Respondent that are erroneous and to the cases cited 
that are inapplicable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT MISCHARATERIZES THE CASE. 
Respondent incorrectly states that the issue presented for 
review is whether a police officer "who is protected by the Utah 
Civil Service Statutes [must] exhaust his administrative remedies 
by first appealing the termination of his employment to the Civil 
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Service Commission. ..even when he claims that his otherwise 
procedurally correct discharge involved a personnel practice 
prohibited by the Utah Protection of Employees Act (the 'Whistle-
blower Statute')." (Emphasis added). 
At issue is whether the Utah Civil Service Statutes do indeed 
provide adequate protection for whistle-blowers. Appellant, in 
their brief, asserts that the statutes do not afford sufficient 
protection and that the Legislature enacted the Whistle-blower 
statute to provide the needed protection by specifically giving a 
whistle-blower a judicial forum in which to present evidence, to 
recover damages, court costs, attorneys fees, and to bring the case 
before a jury. 
Secondly, there is nothing in the record establishing that the 
discharge of Hatton-Ward was "procedurally correct." Respondent 
attempts to characterize this case as a simple procedural employee 
termination matter where, if the governmental agency jumps through 
all the correct hoops and fills out the correct forms, the 
procedure is correct and it is thus irrelevant that the basis for 
the procedure even taking place was wrongfully created upon 
untruths. In this case, Hatton-Ward's record did not warrant a 
discharge. The Appellant can prove that the Police Department 
coerced untrue statements from individuals by threatening them with 
incarceration in order to acquire sufficient data to justify 
conducting an internal investigation of Hatton-Ward. 
In Respondent's Statement of Facts, Respondent, by design or 
by accident, does not list the primary events in chronological 
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order, thereby leading a cursory reader to believe that Hatton-
Ward received a termination letter and then filed a Writ of 
Mandamus. As shown by the dates, Hatton-Ward and others filed 
their Writ in May of 1989, it was dismissed in June of 1989, and 
he received a termination letter in October of 1989. In November 
1989, well within the statutory limit of 180 days after the 
occurrence of the violation of the Whistle-blower statutue, Hatton-
Ward filed a civil action in district court. 
II. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE APPELLANT TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKIING JUDICIAL ACTION. 
The Whistle-blower statute, § 67-21-3 Utah Code Ann., provides 
the following: 
(1) An employer "may not take adverse action against an 
employee because the employee...communicates the 
existence of any waste or public funds, property, or 
manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this 
state... 
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an 
employee because the employee has objected to or refused 
to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably 
believes violates the law of this state... 
The remedies for an employee bringing an action under this 
statute are found in § 67-21-4 Utah Code Ann. which states: 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter 
may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive 
relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 days after 
the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought 
in the circuit court or the county where the alleged 
violation occurred, the county where the complainant 
resides, or the county where the person against whom the 
civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal 
place of business. 
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(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority 
of this action, the employee shall establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the employee has 
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a 
person acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage 
in an activity protected under Section 67-21-3. 
The Whistle-blower statute clearly sets forth a time limit for 
filing an action in court as well as the standard of proof to be 
applied by the Court to the evidence presented by the employee. 
The statute does not mention any need or even preference for 
administrative action, nor does the statute mention any desire that 
an administrative record be prepared. The language of the statute 
obviously intends for the Court to hear the case de novo and to 
render a judgment based upon the evidence. U.C.A. § 67-21-5. The 
statute does not limit the Court to only a review of the findings 
of the Civil Service Commission. 
Furthermore, § 67-19-30 of the Utah Code Ann. states as 
follows: 
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and 
jurisdictional requirements of this section, Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act, and Chapter 
19a, Title 67 in seeking resolution of grievances. 
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of 
injustice oppression, including dismissal from 
employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, 
commission, or condition shall be governed by Chapter 
19a, Title 67 and Chapter 46b, Title 63, the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
The above statute does not state that it applies to Title 67, 
Chapter 21, which contains the Whistle-blower statute. Both the 
above grievance jurisdictional statute and the Whistle-blower 
statute were put into effect in 1989, yet the Legislature did not 
mandate in either statute that administrative procedures were to 
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be used before bringing a civil action under the Whistle-blower 
statute. 
As support for its position that the Civil Service Commissison 
should have first jurisdiction, Respondent cites to several cases 
which all occured several years before the enactment of the 
Whistle-blower statute. For example, Erkman v. Civil Service 
Commission of Provo City, 198 P. 2d 238 (Utah 1948) occurred more 
than forty years before the Whistle-blower statute was placed in 
effect and Fisher v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 
499 P. 2d 854 (1978) came down nearly ten years earlier than the 
statute. Respondent argues that these cases show that the courts 
recognized that the Civil Service Commission should review whistle-
blower type of cases. However, the use of these cases bolsters 
Appellant's position that if the Civil Service Commission had been 
effective in whistle-blower cases and if the administrative process 
had provided the necessary protection for such employees, the 
Legislature would not have perceived a need to enact a separate 
Whistle-blower statute with a provision for a judicial forum and 
presentation of evidence on a de novo basis. The Legislature 
deliberately chose the procedural safeguards of direct court action 
that were to be applied to whistle-blower type of cases. 
Respondent argues that Appellant should have sought relief 
first in a public hearing before the Civil Service Commission and 
that after the Civil Service Commission had had the opportunity to 
exercise its jurisdiction, then the Court could review the 
administrative decision. Respondent's Brief at 21. The Whistle-
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blower statute does not limit the Court to a review of an 
administrative decision- The statute clearly states that the Court 
shall hear the evidence, enter judgment, and award damages. There 
is no need or underlying policy within the statute whereby 
Respondent Respondent cannot be allowed to impose upon the statute 
limitations and requirements that do not exist. 
Respondent accuses the Appellant of "intentionally" "avoiding" 
and "depriving" the Civil Service Commission of its jurisdiction. 
Such an allegation is untrue and presumptous. There is no 
statutory language nor is there case law informing Appellant that 
he was to have first sought relief through administrative 
procedures for wrongful termination due to whistle-blowing 
activi ties, 
III. APPELLANT RIGHTFULLY FILED A COURT ACTION UNDER THE WHISTLE-
BLOWER STATUTE. 
Respondent accuses the Appellant of "intentionally" "avoiding" 
and "depriving" the Civil Service Commission of its jurisdiction. 
Such an allegation is untrue and presumptous. There is no 
statutory language nor is there case law informing Appellant that 
he was to have first sought relief through administrative 
procedures for wrongful termination due to whistle-blowing 
acti vi ties. 
This is a case about an employee who blew the whistle on the 
Police Department. This is not an employee termination case 
involving a mere grievance. The fact that his termination letter 
instructed him to appeal the Police Department's decision to the 
Commission within five days is immaterial. According to that 
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letter, Appellant was discharged for reasons other than whistle-
blowing activities. Because Appellant believed that he had been 
terminated because of his complaints of waste and because of his 
filing of a Writ of Mandamus, Appellant rightfully believed that 
the appropriate step to take was to bring an action in Court under 
the Whistle-blowing statute and to follow the requirements of that 
law. 
The Respondent insists on characterizing this case as an 
"employee termination" case as if a change in semantics will 
somehow allow the Court to ignore the Whistle-blower statute and 
automatically give the matter to the Civil Service Commission for 
a first review of the reasons for Appellant's discharge. 
Consequently, the facts leading up to Appellant's discharge, as 
set out in Appellant's Brief, are relevant. (Respondent wants to 
have Appellant's factual allegations stricken because there are no 
citations to the record. However, because Respondent brought a 
Motion to Dismiss, the facts as alleged in the Complaint are to be 
taken as true by the Court) Obviously, this is a case involving 
more than a too-long mustache, as was the situation in Worral1 v. 
Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). (A case 
cited by Respondent which does not even involve whistle-blowing 
allegations). Appellant is not trying to "frame" his case in such 
a way as to bypass the administrative process. Appellant's 
allegations against the Respondent are serious and of the type that 
the Whistle-blower statute was designed specifically to handle. 
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IV. THE FEDERAL CASES CITED BY THE RESPONDENT ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
The Respondent acknowledges that there are no Utah cases which 
have determined whether or not the Whistle-blowing statute provides 
that an employee may bring a civil action before a court for an 
evidentiary hearing and a judgment without having to first proceed 
through administrative channels resulting in only a judicial review 
of the Commission's decision. Respondent then argues that this 
Court should look to federal decisions for guidance in interpreting 
the Utah statute. 
Respondent's argument is misplaced since the federal statutory 
scheme differs substantially from that of the Utah. In Borrell v. 
United States International Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), a case upon which Respondent heavily relies, the 
Court found that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA,, ) did 
not create a private right of action to enforce against reprisals 
for whistle-blowing. The Court consistently narrowed its findings 
to apply to probationary employees who, under the statute, did not 
have the right to appeal an administrative decision to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board or to a judicial forum. 
As discussed, the Utah Whistle-blowing statute does create a 
private cause of action for a governmental employee. The Utah 
statute also provides for a judicial forum in which to present 
evidence. The Utah statute also sets forth the damages and 
remedies that can be awarded by the Court. The Utah statute is 
substantially different from the federal statute. In addition, the 
federal cases used by Respondent were decided prior to enactment 
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of Utah's Whistle-blowing statute. It is likely that if the Utah 
legislature had wanted to follow the federal example and place the 
statute within an administrative scheme, it would have done so. 
Consequently, Respondent's assertion that federal decisions are 
relevant is incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent focuses its argument on the administrative 
process put into place for determining whether or not an employee 
was validly discharged. Respondent ignores the statutory language 
of the Whistle-blower statute and asks the Court to create 
additions and limitations upon the statute that were not provided 
for in the language or in the intent. Thus, Respondent argues 
what, in its opinion, the Whistle-blower statute should state, 
perhaps in the hope that the Court will bypass the actual 
provisions of the statute. 
Respondent asserts that the policy behind an administrative 
scheme is more compelling than the policy underlying the Whistle-
blower statute: that government efficiency is more important than 
an employee's right to a judicial hearing; that a chance for the 
government to remedy a situation without judicial intervention is 
more necessary than an employee's right to present his evidence in 
Court; that the Civil Service Commission should be given the 
authority to compile a record for the Court to review, instead of 
having the Court hear the evidence and enter its decision; and that 
the protection of the effectiveness and authority of the 
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administrative scheme should take precedence over the protection 
of an employee who had the courage to blow the whistle. 
The Whistle-blowing statutory language should not be allowed 
to be tortured and twisted and left void of its purpose and 
provisions. This Court must find that the Appellant had the right 
under the statute to pursue direct court action and that he was not 
compelled to first place his case before an administrative 
tribunal. Further, the Court must find that Appellant did not 
waive or lose his opportunity to appeal or remedy the termination 
decision by filing a Whistle-blower action pursuant to the statute. 
For the reasons set forth above, and in Appellant's Brief, 
Appellant respectfully requests the Court to deny Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss and to reverse the decision made by the lower 
court in order to permit Appellant to have his day in Court as 
provided by law. 
DATED the 7- day of December, 1990. 
SUZANNE M. DALLIMORE 
AND ASSOCIATES 
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